The paper shows that the basis for the construction of "natural" classifications, "natural" concepts and integrated information is the same property of the objects of the external world -the high correlation of attributes describing the objects of "natural" classes. The hypothesis that the information processes of the brain and mind tuned in the course of evolution to extract highly correlated structure attributes of "natural" objects by forming "natural" concepts of the objects was suggested. This hypothesis is justified by references to a number of famous works. Besides, the original mathematical model is proposed, which formalizes the "natural" classifications, "natural" concepts and the integrated information by G.Tononi, based on a mathematical representation of the system, closed upon itself by causal relationships that form a certain "resonance" of mutual predictions of highly correlated set of attributes of objects of "natural" classes. The results of computer modeling of building "natural" classes and concepts for coded digits are introduced.
Introduction
The structure of the objects of the external world was first analyzed in the form of "natural" classifications (see, section 2). It was noted that "natural" classes of animals or plants have a potentially infinite number of different properties [7] . Naturalists who were building "natural" classifications, also noted that the higher the number of essential attributes objects being compared which were similar, the more likely that there was similarity in other attributes, and the construction of a "natural" classification was just indication: from an infinite number of attributes you need to pass to the limited number of them, which would replace all other attributes . This means that in "natural" classes these attributes are strongly correlated, for example, if there are 128 classes and their having different values of these attributes. But if we consider classes of "animals" or "plants", they differ by such a large (potentially infinite) number of properties that they can't be enumerated. Furthermore, all these properties will be based on statements, confirming this distinction. At the same time, among the properties of some "natural" classes, there will be both observable and nonobservable attributes. To take into account the hidden attributes, we must find their causal exhibitions in the observed attributes. "For example, the natural classification of animals should be based mainly on their internal structure; however, it would be strange, as noted by A.Comte, if we were able to determine the family and specie of one or another animal, only by killing it" [7] .
James. St. Mill gives the following definition of "natural" classification: it is such a classification, which combines the objects into the groups, about which we can make the greatest number of common propositions, and it is based on such properties, which are causes of many others, or at least make their true attributes. He also defines the "image" of the class, which is the forerunner of the "natural" concepts: "our concept of class, the way in which this class is represented in our mind, is the concept of some sample, having all attributes of this class in the highest ... degree".
John St. Mill's arguments were confirmed by naturalists. For example, W. Whewell stated that "The more general statements about the objects make it possible to state a classification, the more it is natural" [6] . Furthermore, L. Rutkowski writes [17] about inexhaustible number of general properties of the "natural" classes: "The more essential attributes are similar in comparable objects, the more likely they are the similar in other attributes". Smirnov E.S. [19] makes a similar statement: "The taxonomic problem is in indication: "from an infinite number of attributes we need to pass to a limited number of them, which would replace all other attributes."
As a result, there were formulated a problem of a "natural" classifications definition, which is still being discussed in the literature [20, 27] . However, from our point of view, there is not enough adequate formalization of the "natural" classification until now.
Principles of categorization in cognitive sciences
In the works of Eleanor Rosch [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] the principles of categorization of "natural" categories, confirming statements of John St. Mill and naturalists, are formulated on the basis of the experiments:
"Cognitive Economy. The first principle contains the almost common-sense notion that, as an organism, what one wishes to gain from one's categories is a great deal of information about the environment while conserving finite resources as much as possible ».
«Perceived World Structure. The second principle of categorization asserts that … perceived world -is not an unstructured total set of equiprobable co-occurring attributes. Rather, the material objects of the world are perceived to possess … high correlational structure. … In short, combinations of what we perceive as the attributes of real objects do not occur uniformly. Some pairs, triples, etc., are quite probable, appearing in combination sometimes with one, sometimes another attribute; others are rare; others logically cannot or empirically do not occur».
It is understood that the first principle is not possible without the second -the cognitive economy is not possible without a structured world. «Natural» objects (basic objects) are rich with information ligaments of observed and functional properties, which form a natural discontinuity, creating categorization. These ligaments form a prototypes of the objects of different classes ("images" of John St. Mill): «Categories can be viewed in terms of their clear cases if the perceiver places emphasis on the correlational structure of perceived attributes … By prototypes of categories we have generally meant the clearest cases of category membership» [14] [15] . « Rosch and Mervis (1975) have shown that the more prototypical of a category a member is rated, the more attributes it has in common with other members of the category and the fewer attributes in common with members of the contrasting categories» [12] [13] .
In future the theory of "natural" concepts suggested by Eleanor Rosch where called the Prototypical Theory of Concepts (Prototype Theory). Its main features are described as follows: «The prototype view (or probabilistic view) keeps the attractive assumption that there is some underlying common set of features for category members but relaxes the requirement that every member have all the features. Instead, it assumes there is a probabilistic matching process: Members of the category have more features, perhaps weighted by importance, in common with the prototype of this category than with prototypes of other categories» [16] .
Unfortunately, in this formulation categorization principles, formulated by Eleanor Rosch and speaking about the reflection in the "natural" concepts of the highly correlated structure of the external world are fade.
In further studies it was found that models based on attributes, similarities and prototypes are not enough to describe classes. It is therefore necessary to take into account the theoretical, causal and ontological knowledge, relating to the objects of classes. For example, people do not only know that birds have wings and can fly, and build their nests in trees, but also facts, that the birds build their nests in trees, because they can fly, and fly because they have wings.
Many researchers believe that the most important theoretical knowledge is the knowledge of causal dependencies because of its functionality. It allows the organism to interfere in external events and to gain control over the environment. Studies have shown that people's knowledge of categories isn't limited by the list of properties, and includes a rich set of causal relationships between these properties, which can be ranked. The importance of these properties also depends on the category causal relationships. It was shown in some experiments [1, 18] , that property is more important in classification, if it more included in causal network of features relationships. In other [8] experiments it was shown, that the property is more important, if it have more reasons.
Considering these studies, Bob Rehder proposed the theory of causal models (causal-model theory), according to which: «people's intuitive theories about categories of objects consist of a model of the category in which both a category's features and the causal mechanisms among those features are explicitly represented. In other words, theories might make certain combinations of features either sensible and coherent … in light of the relations linking them, and the degree of coherence of a set of features might be an important factor determining membership in a category» [9] .
In the theory of causal models, the relationship of the object to a category is based not on a set of attributes or similarity based on attributes, but on the basis of similarity of generating causal mechanisms: «Specifically, a to-be-classified object is considered a category member to the extent that its features were likely to have been generated by the category's causal laws, such that combinations of features that are likely to be produced by a category's causal mechanisms are viewed as good category members and those unlikely to be produced by those mechanisms are viewed as poor category members. As a result, causal-model theory will assign a low degree of category membership to objects that have many broken feature correlations (i.e., cases where causes are present but effects absent or vice versa). Objects that have many preserved correlations (i.e., causes and effects both present or both absent) will receive a higher degree of category membership because it is just such objects that are likely to be generated by causal laws» [9] .
To represent causal knowledge some researchers have used Bayesian networks and causal models [2, [3] [4] . However, these models cannot simulate the cyclic causality because the Bayesian networks do not support cycles.
In his work [10] Bob Rehder proposed a model of causal cycles, based on the "disclosure" of causal graphical models. "Disclosure" is fulfilled by creating a Bayesian network which unfolds in time. Such a network works well for a simulation of "natural" concepts reflecting a highly correlated structure of the external world. However, it not exactly formalize the cycles of causality.
Our model is directly based on cyclic causal connections, represented by fundamentally new mathematical models -fixed points of predictions on causations.
Consciousness as integrated information
If "natural" classification describes the objects of the external world, and that of cognitive science, the perception of the objects in the external world then the integrated information theory of consciousness by G.Tononi examines information processes of the brain on the perception of the objects in the external world.
G.Tononi defines consciousness as the primary concept, which has the following phenomenological characteristics: composition, information, integration, exclusion [5] . For a more accurate determination of these properties G.Tononi introduces the concept of integrated information "integrated information characterizing the reduction of uncertainty is the information, generated by the system that comes in a certain state after the causal interaction between its parts, which is superior information generated independently by its parts themselves" [5] .
In terms of integrated information, phenomenological properties are formulated as follows. In brackets we give the interpretation of these properties from the point of view of the "natural" classification.
1. Composition -elementary mechanisms (causal interactions) can be combined into higher-order ones (forming "natural" classes in the form of causal loops and a hierarchy of "natural" classes);
2. Information -only mechanisms that specify "differences that make a difference" within a system count (only a system of "resonating" causal relationships, forming a class is important. See the illustration of the example below);
3. Integration -only information irreducible to non-interdependent components counts (only system of "resonating" causal relations, indicating an excess of information and the perception of highly correlated structures of "natural" object counts); 4. Exclusion -only the maximum of integrated information counts (i.e the values of attributes, that are mostly interrelated by causal relationships, form the "image" or prototype).
As G.Tononi doesn't consider a "natural" classification of objects in the external world, these properties are defined as the intrinsic properties of the system.
We consider these properties not as intrinsic properties of the system, but as the ability of the system to reflect the complexes of external object causal relations and that consciousness as the ability of a complex hierarchical reflection of a "natural" classification of the external world.
Let's consider the process of reflection of causal relationships ( fig. 1 ). It includes: 1. The objects of the external world (cars, boats, berths) which relate to certain "natural" classes; 2. The process of the brain reflection of objects and the way they are linked by causal relations marked by blue lines;
3. The association of excited brain structures in the systems, indicated by the green ovals. In G.Tononi's theory only the third point of reflection is considered. The totality of the excited groups of neurons form a maximally integrated conceptual structure that defined by G.Tononi as qualia. Integrated information is considered as a system of cyclic causality. However, it remains unclear what represents integrated information. Unified formalization of "natural" classification, "natural" concepts, and consciousness as integrated information by Giulio Tononi Evgenii Vityaev
We hypothesize that the "natural" classification, "natural" concepts and integrated information by G.Tononi are described by the same formulization and are identical to each other. The brain with the help of integrated information is adjusted to the perception of "natural" objects of the external world. This requires a fundamentally new formalism which is described below.
Unified formalization of «natural» classification, «natural» concepts, and consciousness as integrated information
We suggest that the brain carries out all possible conclusions that can be drawn from the causal relationships representing a highly correlated structure of the external world. Then the cycles of conclusions which emerge during this process, are described mathematically by fixed points for which we can not further draw new properties. A set of mutually predicting properties, received at the fixed point, gives an "image" of a class or prototype. If we discover all fixed points using all possible causal relations, observed on a set of objects, then we get the "natural" classification of these objects.
The inference of some fact by the causal relations is a probabilistic (inductively-statistical) prediction. Then inferences in the fixed points will be fixed points of predictions. However, the inference of predictions by the inductive-statistical inference faces the problem of statistical ambiguity, when in the process of inductive inference (training) we receive rules, which infer a contradiction: some property must exist and but not exist at the same time.
And thus a non-trivial problem arises: to define causal relationships, prediction and fixed points such that contradictions do not arise.
We solved this problem by definition of a special semantic probabilistic inference of causal relationships, which provided the necessary mathematical results:
1. it was proved that semantic probabilistic inference discover causal relationships as maximallyspecific rules, which solve the statistical ambiguaty problem and predict without contradictions [21] [22] ; 2. it was proved that fix-points, which base on maximally-specific rules are consistent [21] [22] ; 3. it was proved that fix-points, which base on maximally-specific rules, are probabilistic generalization of the notion of formal concepts [24] [25] ; 4. semantic probabilistic inference satisfy the D.Hebb rule, and may be considered as a formal model of neuron. In that case fix-points, based on maximally-specific rules may be considered as neural cells assemblies [23] . where -is the operator, modifying the set of attributes X by adding or removing some of the attributes, so that the certain criteria f mutual consistency of attributes X predictions by causal relations was maximized. Kri ormation integration o ttributes in its own way in the system of causal relationships MS(X) , in comparison to the theory suggested by G.Tononi. The fixed point is reached when n 1 n Pr (X(a)) Pr (X(a)) , for some n, where n Pr -n multiple application of the operator Pr. Since in each application of the operator Pr the value of Krit criterion increases and in the fixed point reaches a local maximum, then the fixed point, when reflecting some "natural" xternal estimates) a set of attributes of the "im ibing nference. They are general statements about the fter the digit a in the cell 13 (see fig. 3a ) have a line 6 (see fig. 3b ), and predicate is true, then it must the fundamental difference between this approach and the theory of G.Tononi is that the system of causal relations at a fixed point forms by itself (without e age" or prototype while perceiving the "natural" class. Let's illustrate the formation of fixed points by the computer experiment for the detection of "natural" classes/concepts of coded digits. Let's encode the digits, as it is shown in fig. 2 , where a) 24 features, describing the digits, and b) 7 predicates for each feature, descr the type of line in the corresponding cell (or blank cell). Thus, we have 24*7 predicates ij P (a) , i=1,…,24; j=1,…,7, describing a digit a. We will form a training set, consisting of 360 shuffled digits (12 digits of fig. 2 , which are duplicated in 30 copies without specifying where any digit is). In this set 55089 maximum specific regularities were found by semantic probabilistic i objects, mentioned by John St. Mill and W. Whewell. According to these regularities we discovered exactly 12 fixed points, accurately corresponding to the digits. An example of a fixed point for the digit 6 is shown in fig. 3 . Let's consider what this fixed point is. The first regularity of digit 6 in fig. 3 , represented in the first box a brace, means that if 13, 6 P (a) Unified formalization of "natural" classification, "natural" concepts, and consciousness as integrated information by Giulio Tononi Evgenii Vityaev be a line 2 in the cell 3, and predicate is true. The predicted attribute is indicated by a dotted line. Let's write this regularity as . It is easy to see that this regularity is really implemented for all the digits. The second regularity means, that from the line 5 in the cell 9 is true) and the absent of the line 5 in the cell 1 (the negation of the predicate is true) follows the line 7 in the cell 4 ( is true). Denial is denoted by a dash line, as shown at the bottom of fig. 3 . Thus we get a regularity P ( & P (a) 13, 6 P (a) 16, 7 P (a) Fig. 3 shows, that these regularities and attributes of digit 6 form a fixed point. They mutually predict each other. Let's note, that regularities, used in the fixed point, are discovered on all figures, but fixed point (as a system in terms of G.Tononi) discriminate only one digit. This illustrates the phenomenological property 2 which states that "differences (regularites) that make a difference (fixpoints)". Thus, the system of causal relationships perceives (is conscious of) a whole object. Thus digits are identified not by regularities themselves, but their system relationships.
Let
The fixed point forms a prototype by Eleanor Rosch, or "image" by John St. Mill. The program does not know in advance which possible combinations of attributes are correlated with each other.
Conclusion
Suggested unified formalization confirm the proposed main hypothesis about the brain information processes, because it possess all properties that exhibits by these three theories: strong correlation of the attributes of "natural" classes by the set of regularities that forming the fix-point; object is considered a category member to the extent that its features are generated in the fix-point by the category's causal laws (regularities); the set of mutually predicted properties, received at the fixed point, produces "image" or prototype of the class and provide the property of maximum integrated information as it considers in criteria Krit.
